Foundation decisions
Baseline: Platform main at f0125a735ff1dff5687a8438c464863836315bfd.
ADR-024 is proposed. Shared semantic operations and WebMCP remain separate proposals, outside this foundation.
Foundation boundary
- WorkOS authentication and trusted tenant/environment/resource binding establish the connection.
- Tenant activation and
mcp:readare required for protected MCP use. The write-permission tool also requiresmcp:write. - Both tools return fixed, bounded messages. They read no inventory, mutate no business data and emit no business events.
- Semantic commands/queries, generated business tools, browser refactoring, WebMCP and event-envelope changes are excluded.
- Operational attribution records the verified human/client context. Delegation is not proof that the human approved each action.
- Any later business exposure needs separately adopted shared-operation architecture and reviewed domain authorization/provenance.
Resolved direction
The first version uses the person's MCP permissions for the tenant across their connected clients. Separate read-only/write limits for individual clients are deferred.
This delivery introduces Platform's first WorkOS feature flag: Remote MCP access for organizations,
with slug entitlement-remote-mcp-org, to control MCP availability for a tenant. Tenant access is
resolved after authentication without assuming permissions, groups or flags are
present in the Connect token. A bounded tenant-disable delay is accepted; the
actual bound must still be selected and verified.
The proposal uses WorkOS's organization-flags API and existing role-permission lookup. The separate activation-file/revision/acknowledgement proposal is withdrawn. Credential expiry during an admitted request remains an open Program design issue.
The foundation is evaluated through the manual client checks and technical tests. A separate business-user trial belongs with future inventory or query functionality, where participants can evaluate real tasks rather than fixed permission tools.
Design findings
| Review finding | Documentation resolution | Implementation evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Tenant-disable freshness and failures | WorkOS organization capability and user authority resolved after authentication, with optional bounded access-snapshot reuse and recorded withdrawal delay. | Planned; WorkOS API documented, integration and actual bounds unverified. |
| Lost consent attribution | Verified WorkOS sid becomes typed consentId, preserved through internal credentials/context and safe operational attribution, with round-trip/negative tests. |
Planned; no codec/context change or test execution. |
| Permission-denial recovery | Stable user/tenant 403 reasons and administrator recovery, distinct from 401 credential renewal, actual OAuth scope deficit and dependency 503. |
Response-fixture experiments show client presentation of 403/503 explanations; real WorkOS recovery is separate implementation work. |
| Navigation-coupled permissions | Proposed core permission catalog, compatible navigation references, bootstrap-owned export and non-granting provisioning checks. | Planned; existing registry and tooling unchanged. |
Open decisions and evidence
The working tool names are hello_read and hello_write. Select the production
client/environment, owners/appetite, authority and
withdrawal bounds and operating limits before dependent
work. Response experiments record the observed
local client presentation; they do not exercise WorkOS authentication or authorization.
Use the implementation test plan for the integrated foundation,
including real authentication recovery.